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A C R I T I Q U E OF C I V I L I Z A T I O N A L D O M I N A T I O N
Alexander Rustow. Freedom and Domination: A Historical Critique of
Civilization. Abbreviated Translation from the German by Salvator
Attanasio. Edited and Introduced by Dankwart A. Rustow. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. $54.50.
T h e original three volumes (1780 pages) of this work appeared in
German in 1950, 1952, and 1957. Most notes were eliminated, even
though 29 pages of notes remain, and the original text was condensed to
one-half of its original length in order to produce this one-volume
English translation (716 pages). T h e original three volumes have become
three parts of the present volume.
Biographical Sketch
T h e author was born in Wiesbaden in 1885 and died in Heidelberg in
1963. T h e author's early interest in philology and esthetics was changed
to politics after his experience in the first world war. In the course of the
1920s he m o v e d f r o m socialism to liberalism, e n d i n g u p with
neoliberalism by the e n d of the 1930s. For Rustow this m e a n t
competition free of monopolies, oligopolies, tariffs, and subsidies; full
equality of educational opportunity; and a confiscatory inheritance tax.
From 1933 to 1949 he exiled himself and his family from Germany to
Turkey, where he started to write his three-volume work in the 1940s
under the influence of neoliberalism.
Author's Foreword and Introduction
According to the author, this critique is based on his philosophy of
human nature: "I affirm freedom and reject domination, I affirm
humaneness and reject barbarism, I affirm peace and reject violence" (p.
xxix).
I. T h e Origins of Domination
Civilization began with the agricultural revolution 10,000 years ago,
according to the author, but history did not begin until about 5,000 years
ago when nomadic peoples began to migrate into agricultural lands, to
conquer the people there, and to start making a living by exploiting the
surplus value of the peasants. T h u s began that division and specialization
of labor which characterized civilization, and its subsequent class
struggles between rulers and ruled. Further migrations followed about
2000 BC and 1200 BC in Greece, the Indus Valley, Mesopotamia, Asia
Minor, Syria, Egypt, Iran, India, and Palestine.
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T h e nomadic conquerors had war chariots in 3000 BC, but they used
the horses without the chariots in 1200 BC, which they continued to use
until the e n d of the Middle Ages. Consequently, the general pattern over
the first 45 centuries of history was for the mounted knights to dominate
and exploit the plow peasants. T h e knights, however, were converted by
the culture that they conquered, so that the fusion of the two cultures
resulted in a higher culture than either one taken by itself. Although the
noble knights ostensibly conquered the common peasants, the latter
m a d e some sort of cultural conquest in return. However, the surplus
value went to the knights, not to the peasants. From a historical and
sociological point of view, the "original sin" of human history was the
conquest of peasants by nomads, and this original sin was "the common
heritage of all civilized peoples" (p. 587). And this original sin made all
subsequent history "a history of class struggles" (p. 549), that is to say,
struggles between f r e e d o m for the u p p e r class and equality f o r the lower
class.
In the beginning (and end) of civilization there may well have been
domination versus f r e e d o m , according to Rustow's thesis, but that all or
even most of the dominance came f r o m nomads may be questionable.
T h e r e is some anthropological evidence to suggest that the settled
f a r m e r was more warlike than the wandering h e r d e r , which is consistent
with the story of Cain, a tiller of the soil, killing his brother Abel, a
shepherd.
Although domination and resistance may have characterized h u m a n
history, the class struggle was not always between nomads and peasants.
T h e r e were at least as many imperial expansions on the part of
civilizations as there were migrations on the part of nomads. T h e author
obviously did not mean to limit domination to nomads, but his emphasis
on this theme in the first part of this book could leave this impression.
However, this impression could be a function of the condensation of this
book f r o m its original three volumes.
It would be desirable for some one some time to make a systematic
study of how many nomadic dominations of peasants characterized
h u m a n history, compared with how many civilized dominations of
g a t h e r e r s , h u n t e r s , f a r m e r s , s h e p h e r d s , a n d o t h e r civilizations
characterized h u m a n history. My impression is that the latter would far
o u t n u m b e r the former. Perhaps historians have already done some of
these studies.
II. T h e Path of Freedom
According to Alexander Rustow, Greece was the only ancient culture
which took a chance on freedom. But this venture was questionable at
best, if we can believe Thucydides' account of Pricles, the epitome of
democratic Athens: "Athens, though in n a m e a democracy, became in
fact a government ruled by its foremost citizen" (p. 184). What kind of
democracy is this?
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Since Augustan Rome was modeled on Periclean Athens, and since it
was characterized by so much peace and justice, the author proposed that
the Roman Empire "was the happiest epoch in human history" (p. 220),
and an "empire of freedom" (p. 223). T h e monarchy was said to be more
democratic than the republic. What kind of democracy and freedom is
this? What kind of double-speak is this? An empire of freedom seems like
a contradiction of terms.
T h e democracy that was Greece and the freedom that was Rome fell
from grace into the arms of medieval feudalism and the salvation of
religion, as opposed to the natural religion of Greece and Rome. Here,
the a u t h o r seems to find the Middle Ages characterized by more
dominance than the Roman Empire, which may be questioned.
T h e f r e e d o m of the Italian Renaissance was eclipsed by the
Reformation and Counter-Reformation, which were darker than the
"Dark Ages." T h e life situation seems to get worse as time goes on in
Western civilization. T h e decline and fall of Rome seems to usher in a
general disintegration of peace and freedom.
Finally, the Enlightenment came in the late 17th and 18th centuries,
and this was the last of the Golden Ages, which was put to an end by the
totalitarianism of France in 1792. Presumably, there was some respite
from domination in the Enlightenment, but this did not last too long.
This parade of freedom versus domination contains a lot of useful and
interesting information, but it fails to hang together as a coherent whole
in the mind of this reader. T h e distinction between freedom and
domination is not always clear nor consistent. Sometimes, domination
seems to be called freedom. T h e author has also put civilization in
general aside, in order to concentrate on Western civilization.
III. Domination versus Freedom
This last part of the book covers the last two centuries, where
domination seems to prevail in two different forms: rationalism and
irrationalism. According to the author, the trouble with these two forms
is their separation from each other, resulting in their tendency to try to
dominate each other as a result of a "sinful lust for power" (p. 390). They
should be working together, in which case there would be no domination.
Rationalism has taken many forms, such as pragmatism, behaviorism,
materialism, mastery of nature, technocracy and progress, demand for
equality, isolation of the individual, mass society, capitalist degeneration,
pluralistic degeneration, cultural depletion, and nihilism. T h e author
goes into considerable detail analyzing these rational tendencies, and
their contribution to domination.
Irrationalism has also taken many forms, such as conservative reaction
to the French Revolution, cult of personality, hypocrisy, totalitarianism
of teh general will, nationalism, militarism, communism, democratic
socialism and the welfare state, bolshevism, fascism, and national
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socialism. These irrational tendencies are also analyzed in considerable
detail. T h e author's analysis of Marx a n d Communism is extremely clear,
and his analysis of National Socialism is quite comprehensive. While he
f o u n d a "basic similarity between communism and nazism" (p. 644),
Hitler was associated with the devil (p. 654), because his "end was purely
egocentric" (p. 657), but Stalin was not.
Conclusions
After all of these exhaustive analyses and critiques, the final chapter
t u r n e d out to be little more than an anti-communist tract as the author's
contribution to the Cold War, which was at its height in the 1950s. After
criticizing domination as the enemy of freedom t h r o u g h o u t the three
parts of this book, the author concludes by raising the question as to
which side of the Cold War will win (p. 611) and, consequently, rule the
world?
T h e author admits that " T h e five centuries of Western colonial
imperialism are a bloody stain on the historic record of humanity" (pp.
662-663), but the fulfillment of the Western idea of f r e e d o m is required
by the author's philosophy of h u m a n nature (p. 664). Now, Communism
is denounced and associated with the devil: "Let us not forget that this is
the enemy we are facing. Diabolic is too mild an expression for such a
degree of inhumanity, f o r the devil, however begrudgingly, recognizes
God's supremacy. . . . T h e r e can be no peaceful coexistence between
humanity and inhumanity. . . . Nor must we allow the other side to
appeal ot our own feelings of humanity and use them as a fifth column.
T h e same unnatural world situation also imposes on us a duty to d e f e n d
and arm ourselves. War is i n h u m a n , immoral, and ultimately senseless:
pacifism is an indisputable d e m a n d of humanity" (p. 666). "But as long as
one part of mankind is highly armed, ready to commit any act of
inhumanity in its thirst for superstratification [world dominion], and
threatens the f r e e d o m of the rest of mankind, it is our foremost duty to
resist this threat a n d to arm our selves at least to an equal level. T h e r e is
no doubt that in an atomic T h i r d World War there will be no victors but
only vanquished" (pp. 666-667).
In this Cold War against Communism, we must get rid of Western
colonial imperialism in o r d e r to "deprive the Bolsheviks of one of their
most convenient a n d dangerous p r o p a g a n d a talking points"(p. 668) a n d
also in o r d e r to expose Soviet colonial imperialism, such as in Hungary
1956. T h e third part of this book was dedicated " T o the Hungarian
Freedom Fighters" (p. 369). T o be sure, the original sin of domination
remains in the West, and should be cleansed.
Finally, domination is not all bad: "Without superstratification
[domination] and its historic consequences t h r o u g h o u t less than ten
thousand years there would not have been the remotest chance of the
technical and other preconditions for O n e World coming together" (p.
674). If we can get rid of domination now, "the blessing of the sin would
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be freed from its curse" (p. 674). In other words, thanks to domination
we shall now be better off if we can get rid of it than we would have been
had it never happened in the First place. It's nice to know that sins can
bless as well as curse. It's also a comfort to know that the force, fraud, and
violence of domination were so good so far, but now that they have
brought us to where we want to be in the world, we want to abolish them
before they can be used against us as we used them against others during
the last five centuries in order to get to the position of dominance we have
now achieved, so that we can now live the good life without it.
This book is full of historical and sociological facts of great interest and
importance. It is also full of hypotheses well worth f u r t h e r research and
testing. T h e author's critique of civilization includes some self-criticism
of Western civilization which is commendable as far as it goes. But, it
could have gone a lot further, and it probably would have gone a lot
f u r t h e r if the author had not been biased by the prevailing ideology of
anti-communism, which no longer prevails.
William Eckhardt

CIVILIZATIONAL ASCETICISM AND C U L T U R A L HEGEMONY
Theodore H. von Laue. The World Revolution of Westernization: The
Twentieth Century in Global Perspective. Oxford University Press, 1987.
Which are the most i m p o r t a n t factors in the rise and fall of
civilizations? This question reminds me of my experience with a broken
thermometer when I was a youngster. T h e shiny bits of mercury from
the thermometer had scattered over the table top. Whenever I thought
my little fingers were closing in on a globule, it scooted off. T h e keys to
civilizational dynamics are similarly elusive. Marxist structuralists leave
me wondering about the roles of individuals and their ideological
passions. Sociobiologists slight the insights of politics and economics.
Historians and economists usually ignore the natural environment and
geographic location, or treat them superficially. Geographers have not
concerned themselves with these problems since the days of Ellsworth
Huntington. And so it goes.
Theodore von Laue's favored factor is religion and morality. He also
wonders about the "collective subconscious" and the ways in which the
individual psyche is directed to the accomplishment of societal tasks, a
topic which he points out is not yet studied on a global scale. Right off, he
eschews terms like "capitalism" and "class struggle," for, he asserts,
"Social life is not shaped by the ways in which . . . human beings engage
nature through production." (p. xv) I appreciate his strenuous effort to
view the world of the twentieth century freshly, but one does not have to
be a marxist to see the class-struggle dynamic as a very complex and
important p h e n o m e n o n in the structure of o u r politico-economic
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